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THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN ACCESS LAW PUBLISHING
by
Jessica Litman*
The conventional model of scholarly publishing uses the copyright system as a
lever to induce commercial publishers and printers to disseminate the results of
scholarly research. Recently, we have seen a number of high-profile experiments
seeking to use one of a variety of forms of open access scholarly publishing to
develop an alternative model. Critics have not quarreled with the goals of open
access publishing; instead, they've attacked the viability of the open access
business model.
If we are examining the economics of open access publishing, we shouldn't limit
ourselves to the question whether open access journals have fielded a business
model that would allow them to ape conventional journals in the information
marketplace. We should be taking a broader look at who is paying what money
(and comparable incentives) to whom, for what activity, and to what end. Are
either conventional or open access journals likely to deliver what they're being
paid for?
Law journal publishing is one of the easiest cases for open access publishing. Law
scholarship relies on few commercial publishers. The majority of law journals
depend on unpaid students to undertake the selection and copy editing of articles.
Nobody who participates in any way in the law journal article research, writing,
selection, editing and publication process does so because of copyright incentives.
Indeed, copyright is sufficiently irrelevant that legal scholars, the institutions that
employ them and the journals that publish their research tolerate considerable
uncertainty about who owns the copyright to the works in question, without
engaging in serious efforts to resolve it. At the same time, the first-copy cost of law
reviews is heavily subsidized by the academy to an extent that dwarfs both the
mailing and printing costs that make up law journals' chief budgeted expenditures
and the subscription and royalty payments that account for their chief budgeted
revenues. That subsidy, I argue, is an investment in the production and
dissemination of legal scholarship, whose value is unambiguously enhanced by
open access publishing.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I'm grateful to Anne Cottingim, Francesco
Reale, Catherine Brainerd, Lydia Loren, Dan Hunter, Michael Madison, Murl Smith, and
Peter Siroka for giving me useful information to chew on, and to Peter DiCola, Peter
Hammer, Michael Carroll, Jeff Mackie-Mason, and Jon Weinberg for suggestions,
comments, and questions that helped me find my way.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of open access publishing have suggested that while its aims may
be laudable, its proposed business models are deficient. Nobody, they insist,
has yet demonstrated that open access publishing can generate profits, or even
support a nonprofit periodical as a going concern. Authors and publishers
should be wary, they continue, until the advocates of open access publishing
can show that they have devised a financially viable model.' Someone must
pay the costs of publishing. Moreover, they suggest that even scholarly
publishing has something to fear from proponents of open access:
By introducing an author-pays model, Open Access risks undermining
public trust in the integrity and quality of scientific publications that has
been established over hundreds of years. The subscription model, in
which the users pay (and institutions like libraries that serve them),
ensures high quality, independent peer review and prevents commercial
interests from influencing decisions to publish. This critical control
measure would be removed in a system where the author--or indeed
his/her sponsoring institution-pays. Because the number of articles
published will drive revenues, Open Access publishers will continually
See, e.g., Ass'N OF LEARNED & PROF'L SOC'Y PUBLISHERS, THE FACTS ABOUT OPEN
ACCESS (2005), available at http://www.alpsp.org/publications/FAOAcompleteREV.pdf.;
see also Ass'n Litteraire et Artistique Internationale, Memorandum on Creative Commons
Licenses (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.alai-usa.org/recent-developments.htm
("Caveat auctor! Let the author beware before she chooses! A CC license may be
appropriate and desirable for some authors, particularly academics, but, given the dangers
the license poses to authors' prospects for control over and compensation for their works, the
decision to license should be made with a full appreciation of the possible consequences.");
Elsevier, Elsevier's Comments on Evolutions In Scientific, Technical and Medical
Publishing and Reflections on Possible Implications of Open Access Journals for the UK 2
(Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.elsevier.com/authored-news/corporate/images/
UKST]Elsevier position-paper-onstm in-UK.pdf ("The Open Access business model in
its current form has not proven its financial viability...").
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be under pressure to increase output, potentially at the expense of
quality.
2
Most of the literature debating the peril and promise of open access
publishing has focused on scientific periodicals, where subscription prices are
astronomical, research is commonly supported by grant funding, commercial
publishers and printers dominate, and research results are time sensitive.
3
Scholarly publishing in the sciences is shared among commercial journals and
journals published by non-profit learned societies (who may rely on
subscription income to fund society activities) but printed by commercial
publishers. 4 Proposals to shift the costs of publishing from subscribers to those
who fund scientific research in order to support an open access model have
drawn alarm from other disciplines, where research normally receives little
outside funding. 5 A variety of high profile open access journal publishing
6efforts have launched. Critics focus on the ability of these efforts to make
money as well as the conventional publications they seek to compete with.
The conventional model of scholarly publishing uses the copyright system
as a lever to induce commercial publishers and printers to disseminate the
results of scholarly research. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Judge
Leval concluded that photocopying individual articles from scientific journals
was not fair use in part because of the nature of the market for scientific
research:
Copyright protection is vitally necessary to the dissemination of scientific
articles of the sort that are at issue. This is not because the authors insist
on being compensated. To the contrary, such articles are written and
published without direct payment to the authors. But copyright protection
is essential to finance the publications that distribute them. Circulation of
such material is small, so that subscriptions must be sold at very high
prices. If cheap photoduplications could be freely made and sold at a
fraction of the subscription price, Catalysis would not sell many
subscriptions; it could not sustain itself, and articles of this sort would
simply not be published. And without publishers prepared to take the
financial risk of publishing and disseminating such articles, there would
be no reason for authors to write them; even if they did, the articles
2 Elsevier, supra note 1, at 2. The assumptions underlying the position seem to be, first,
that the ability to charge subscribers monopoly prices allows editors to choose the best
manuscripts without regard to commercial considerations and that, because the editors of
open access journals will need to rely on authors' payments for their operating expenses,
they will come under pressure to accept manuscripts of lower quality to make up for the
revenue that would otherwise have been supplied by subscription fees.
3 See, e.g., Nature, Nature Debates: E-Access, http://www.nature.com/nature/debates/
e-access/index.html; Nature, Web Focus: Access to the Literature: The Debate Continues,
http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/accessdebate/index.html.
4 See Frank Gannon, Ethical Profits from Publishing, 5 EMBO REP. 1 (2004), available
at http://www.nature.com/embor/joumal/v5/nl/full/7400057.html.
5 See, e.g., John Ewing, The Orthodoxy of Open Access, NATURE, Sept. 13, 2003,
http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/accessdebate/32.html.
6 See, e.g., BioMed Central, http://www.biomedcentral.com/; Creative Commons,
http://creativecommons.org/; Public Library of Science, http://www.plos.org/.
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would fail to achieve distribution that promoted the progress of science.
Being the type of authorship that the copyright laws were designed to
protect, this type of publication has a stronger claim to 13rotection from
copying than secretive private functional communications.
The role of copyright in the dissemination of scholarly research is in many
ways curious, since neither authors nor the entities that compensate them for
their authorship are motivated by the incentives supplied by the copyright
system. Rather, copyright is a bribe to entice professional publishers and
printers to reproduce and distribute scholarly works. Copyright is the coin these
publishers are accustomed to. The authors of scholarly works (and the
institutions that pay their salaries and support their research) have had no
objection to paying for publishing in the currency of copyrights, since the
copyrights had little intrinsic value in the academy. After many years of buying
copyrights cheap and selling them dear, commercial publishers (and the
scholarly societies and noncommercial publishers who learned to emulate them
to compensate their professional printers) have built up a system of
proliferating journals at astronomical subscription prices. As technology has
spawned new methods of restricting access to works, and copyright law has
enhanced copyright owners' rights to do so, the publishers of scholarly journals
have begun to experiment with subscription models that charge for access by
the article, the reader, or the year. Copyright may have been a cheap bribe
when paper was expensive, but it has arguably distorted the scholarly
publishing system in ways that undermine the enterprise of scholarship. While
copyrights may have seemed a cheap price to induce publishers to bring out
scholarly journals, publishers' exercise of copyright privileges in a digital
world may already have become too expensive to bear.
If we are examining the economics of open access publishing, then, we
shouldn't limit ourselves to the question whether open access journals have
fielded a business model that would allow them to ape conventional journals in
the information marketplace. We should be taking a broader look at who is
paying what money (and comparable incentives) to whom, for what activity,
and to what end. Are either conventional or open access journals likely to
deliver what they're being paid for?
Because this symposium addresses open access law publishing, I focus
most of my attention on law journal publications. Scholarly law publishing
presents a particularly straightforward case for analysis, because it lacks many
of the complications common to other scholarly publishing. Commercial law
journals 8 and learned law society journals 9 exist, but they are far outnumbered
7 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), af'd,
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
8 E.g., Kluwer Law International, http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/; Thomson West,
Intellectual Property Law Review, http://west.thomson.com/product/14631153/product.asp.
9 E.g., Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Publications, http://www.csusa.org/pubs.htn
(describing the Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.); American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA), Quarterly Journal, http://www.aipla.org/
[Vol. 10:4
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by law journals published by or affiliated with law schools.' 0 Peer-reviewed
law journals I I are rare, and the legal version of peer review is particularly mild.
Legal research is only infrequently funded by outside grants, and is highly
unlikely to generate a successful patent application. Thus, a variety of
complications common to scholarly publishing can be put to one side as we
examine the economics of law journal publishing. As I will later explain,
however, I think it is appropriate to generalize from the example of scholarly
legal publishing to scholarly publishing in other fields.
Law journal publishing is one of the easiest cases for open access
publishing. 12 We rely on few commercial publishers. The majority of law
journals depend on unpaid students to undertake the selection and copy editing
of articles. Nobody who participates in any way in the law journal article
research, writing, selecting, editing, and publication process does so because of
copyright incentives. Indeed, copyright is sufficiently irrelevant that legal
scholars, the institutions that employ them, and the journals that publish their
research tolerate considerable uncertainty about who owns the copyright to the
works in question, without engaging in serious efforts to resolve it. At the same
time, the first-copy cost of law reviews is heavily subsidized by the academy to
an extent that dwarfs both the mailing and printing costs that make up law
journals' chief budgeted expenditures and the subscription and royalty
payments that account for their chief budgeted revenues. That subsidy, I argue,
is an investment in the production and dissemination of legal scholarship whose
value is unambiguously enhanced by open access publishing.
In Part II of this Article, I give a brief sketch of the slow growth of open
access publishing in legal research. In Part III, I look at the conventional budget
of a student-edited law journal, which excludes all of the costs involved in
generating the first copy of any issue, and suggest that we cannot make an
intelligent assessment of the economics of open access law publishing unless
we account for input costs, like the first-copy cost, that conventional analysis
ignores. In Part IV, I develop a constructive first-copy cost based on
assumptions about the material included in a typical issue of the law journal,
and draw inferences based on a comparison of the expenses involved in the first
copy, and the entities that pay them, with the official law journal budget. In
Part V, I examine the implications of my argument for open access law
publishing. In Part VI, I argue that the conclusions that flow from my analysis
apply to nonlegal publishing as well.
Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/Quarterly-Journall/Default800.htm (describing the
American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal).
10 See LExIsNEXIs, DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS (Michael H. Hoffheimer ed. 2005),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/prodev/lawreview/default.asp.
'1 E.g., Journal of Philosophy, Science & Law, http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpslU
index.html; Journal of Online Law, http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/ol/.
12 Accord Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 623-24 (2005).
20061
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II. BACKGROUND
As the price of scholarly journal subscriptions has increased, and the costs
of mass dissemination have shrunk, scholars and libraries have proposed
alternatives to traditional journal publishing. The phrase "open access
publishing" has come to describe disseminating material, usually over the
Internet, both free of charge and free of conventional copyright restrictions on
further dissemination. The most common flavors of open access publishing
today are open access journals, which make their contents available for free
over the Internet, and open access archives, which maintain free electronic
copies of scholarship published in both conventional and electronic journals. 13
Because journals publishing scientific and medical research are among the most
expensive subscriptions, and widespread prompt access to scientific research
results is crucial for healthy scientific advance, open access publishing in the
sciences and medicine has progressed quickly in surprisingly little time. In a
relatively short time, advocates of open access publishing have launched high-
profile, peer-reviewed, open access journals and archives. Even commercial
publishers have begun to experiment with more-nearly open models of
publishing. 14
In comparison with science and medicine, open access legal publishing has
grown more slowly.1 5 Although a handful of law journals published free online
versions of their journals as early as ten years ago, 16 most have relied on a
combination of conventional print publishing and making their contents
available, for a royalty payment, to commercial legal databases Lexis and
Westlaw. In the 1990s, a few legal scholars posted preprints of their articles on
their personal websites, and in 1996, Pitt Law School launched Jurist, which
collected links to law professors' online archives of their own work. 17 In 1995,
the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) launched the Legal Scholarship
Network, a commercial online depository for legal scholarship that archived
law journal drafts and preprints at no charge and made them available to
libraries and universities for a modest subscription fee.18 SSRN now makes the
text of all of its abstracts and most of its papers available to individuals for
personal non-commercial use at no charge. 19 In 1999, academics set up the
13 See generally Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, http://www.earlham.edu/-peters/
fos/overview.htm.
14 See generally Ass'N OF LEARNED AND PROF'L SOC'Y PUBLISHERS, supra note 1.
15 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 622-23,631.
16 See, e.g., Duke Law, Journals, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/ ("Since 1996-97,
all issues of Duke's student-edited journals have been published in freely available electronic
versions on the Law School website."); Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law
Review, http://www.mttlr.org/html/home.html; Richmond Journal of Law & Technology,
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/about.asp.
17 University of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law, Jurist F.A.Q., http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/faq/.
18 Social Science Research Network, Legal Scholarship Network, http://www.ssrn.com/
lsn/.
19 Social Science Research Network, Frequently Asked Questions, http://ssrn.com/
update/general/ssrnfaq.html.
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Berkeley Electronic Press (BE Press) to compete with SSRN. BE Press offers
electronic law journals and archived legal research under what it describes as a
"quasi-open access policy." 2° Legal scholars' participation in open access
archives is increasing steadily, but we have so far seen little movement toward
open access journal publishing. In 2005, the Creative Commons launched an
open access law publishing project in which it sought to persuade law journals
to adopt open access publishing principles. So far, it has managed to persuade
only twenty-eight U.S. law journals to sign on.
2 1
The standard critique of open access publishing proposals is an economic
one: without the access controls and subscription revenues facilitated by
conventional copyright arrangements, we will have difficulty funding the
publication of high quality, useful research. The critique relies on some implicit
assumptions about budget and subsidy that it is useful to make more explicit.
III. THE LAW JOURNAL BUDGET
In preparing this paper, I looked at the budgets of several law journals, but
here I base my discussion on a fictional composite, which I call the Model Law
Review. The Model Law Review publishes four issues in each annual volume,
and each issue contains, on average, three articles and two notes. If you were
able to obtain the budget document for the fictional Model Law Review from
the fictional law school its student editors attend (which we can call the Model
School of Law), you would discover that its budget looks much like the budgets
of actual law reviews. The only significant expense noted in the budget
document is the cost of printing and mailing issues, which is contracted out to
either Darby or Hein, who calculate the charge on a per-page per-subscriber
basis. The printer charges $10,000 for an average issue, so an annual four-issue
volume will cost about $40,000 to print and mail. Model Law Review charges
$32.00 for a yearly subscription and has 500 subscribers, 22 so the budget
20 Berkeley Electronic Press, Quasi-Open Access Policy, http://www.bepress.com/
quasi-openaccess.html.
21 See Science Commons, Open Access Law: Adopting Journals,
http://creativecommons.org/science/literature/oalawjournals.
The 2005 LexisNexis Directory of Law Reviews includes 680 different law journals
published in the United States: 181 general student-edited law reviews, 314 special-focus
student edited law reviews, 114 faculty-reviewed journals, 43 commercial or trade law
journals, and 28 other law journals. LExIsNEXIS, supra note 10. 10.
The project's success with persuading law professors to pledge to publish only in
journals that follow open access publishing principles is even more modest. So far, only six
law professors have agreed to pledge. See Science Commons, Open Access Law: Authors,
http://creativecommons.org/science/literature/oalawauthors.
22 The majority of these subscribers are law libraries. The Model Law Review does not
charge institutional subscribers a different price from the price for individual subscribers.
Few law journals have adopted differential pricing. Compare Harvard Law Review,
Ordering Information, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/order.shtml ($55 individual; $200
institutional) with Chicago-Kent Law Review, Subscriptions, http://lawreview.kentlaw.edu/
subscriptions-webpage.htm ($35/year); Environmental Law, Subscription and Back Issue
Information, http://www.lclark.edu/org/envtl/subscribe.html ($40/year); Hoftsra Law
2006]
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document reports $16,000 in subscription revenues. In addition, Model receives
royalties from Lexis, Westlaw, and the Copyright Clearance Center, in the
aggregate amount of $8,000. This leaves a deficit of $16,000, which is covered





Law school support 16,000
Total $40,000 $ 40,000
Model Law Review Budget
The budget I describe omits a number of costs. It fails to account for rent,
electricity, and other overhead incurred in the maintenance of the law journal
offices, or the assistance of clerical staff hired and paid by the Model School of
Law. To the extent that the law school offers credit for law review
participation, it fails to factor in the tuition costs of an hour of law school
credit. The Model Law Review pays none of these costs, so it includes none of
them in its budget. More importantly, because the law review itself pays none
of the first-copy costs of an issue of the journal, it does not include those costs
in its budget either. Because it acquires manuscripts from their authors royalty-
free, and pays its editors and production staff no money, it has no budget line
for content or editorial expenses.
That doesn't mean that legal scholarship is free. Entities other than the
Model Law Review in fact pay significant amounts of money to produce the
content that the law journal publishes so cheaply.
Review, Subscription Information, http://www.hofstra.edu/Academics/law/lawrev/
lawlawrev-sub.cfm ($26/volume for all subscribers); Lewis & Clark Law Review,
Subscriptions, http://www.lclark.edu/org/lclr/subscriptions.html ($40/year); Journal of Law
in Society, Subscription Information, http://www.law.wayne.edu/organization/lawjournal/
subscription.htm ($25/year); Michigan Law Review, Subscribe,
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/about subscribe.htm ($60/year); Stanford Law Review,
Subscriptions and Back Issues, http://www.stanford.edu/group/lawreview/contact/
subscriptions.htm ($42/year); Wayne Law Review, Subscriptions,
http://www.law.wayne.edu/organization/lawreview/subscriptionshtm ($32/year); Yale Law
Journal, Subscriptions, http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/subscriptions.asp ($55/year).
[Vol. 10:4
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IV. CALCULATING A CONSTRUCTIVE FIRST-COPY COST
Because the market for law journal articles, notes, and comments clears at
zero, there's rarely a need to calculate the first-copy cost of a typical issue of a
legal periodical. 23 That shouldn't, though, obscure the fact that the first-copy
costs are real and people pay them. The price of legal scholarship is not,
however, set in the marketplace for legal periodicals but in the marketplaces for
the people who write and edit them. Thus, to arrive at a plausible rough
estimate of the first-copy cost of the Model Law Review, we need to make a
number of simplifying assumptions. I also intentionally make very conservative
estimates, setting the values included in the first-copy cost at the low end of the
plausible range and omitting a variety of expenses that in fact figure into the
first-copy costs in the real world.
24
As I said earlier, the average issue of our fictional journal contains three
articles and two notes. The articles cost the journal nothing, but are typically
written by law professors, who are paid by the law schools that employ them to
produce published legal scholarship. Let's imagine that law professors whose
articles land in the pages of the Modem Law Review are paid, on average,
$100,000 per year, and that their institutions spend another $25,000 per year on
their employee benefits.25 Let's further assume that these professors publish, on
average, two articles (or the equivalent in law journal pages) per year, and that
they are expected by their academic institutions to devote 40% of their working
time to teaching, 40% to scholarship, and 20% to service. Ignoring the cost of
overhead, research assistance, books, and photocopies, we can set the cost of
each law review article at $25,000. An average issue of the Modem Law
Review with three articles would then reflect $75,000 in article writing costs;
the articles in a four-issue volume would cost $300,000.
Next, we need to account for the student-authored notes and comments.
There it is more difficult to come up with an average price, but one plausible
measure is the cost of a credit hour at the Model School of Law. Many law
schools give students a single academic credit for a published note or comment.
Others refuse to give credit, but would allow a student who was not publishing
a note or comment to earn academic credit in an independent study for an
equivalent paper. The fees for a single hour of academic credit vary, but at the
Model School of Law, which charges $22,500 annual tuition, a single credit
hour would cost $750. Each issue of the Model Law Review, thus, reflects
23 See, e.g., Marjolein Bot, Johan Burgemeester & Hans Roes, The Cost of Publishing
an Electronic Journal: A General Model and a Case Study, D-LIB MAG., Nov. 1998,
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/november98/1 lroes.html ("The costs of authors, editors and
referees are ignored, since they do not ask for a financial reward...").
24 I omit, for example, tuition subsidies as well as overhead and research expenses paid
separately from (and in addition to) salaries.
25 See JOHN W. CURTIS ET AL., AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, INEQUITIES PERSIST
FOR WOMEN AND NON-TENURE-TRACK FACULTY: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
STATUS OF THE PROFESSION 2004-05 40, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/About/
committees/committee+repts/compensation/ecstatreport2004-05/.
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$1,500 in note writing costs. We can peg the cost of the notes and comments in
each volume at $6,000.
So far, the constructive first-copy cost of a year's worth of the Model Law
Review is $306,000. We have not yet, however, accounted for editing and
production. Both are performed by law students who usually receive no direct
payment of money (but earn a credential for their service that they can redeem
later in the employment market). There's no easy proxy to account for the value
of their editing and production work. In the absence of a better rubric, I suggest
we measure the amount of money those students would have earned if they had
spent those hours doing a work/study job. For that purpose, we can value the
hours with reference to the minimum wage. I canvassed law journals to get a
rough estimate of the time student editors spend in selection, editing, cite
checking and other production work, and received widely varying estimates.26
After talking with different editors, I concluded that it was plausible to assume
for the purposes of this model that each of the 20 published pieces in a single
volume of the Model Law Review reflects an average of fifteen hours of time
spent in selecting among different submissions, ten hours of actual editing of
the manuscript and twenty-five hours of cite checking, proofreading, font
changing and other production-related tasks. The federal minimum wage (and
the minimum wage of twenty-five states) is currently $5.15 per hour. 7 $5.15 x
50 hours x (12 articles + 8 notes) = $5,150, bringing the annual first-copy cost







If this imputed first-copy cost is plugged into the Model Law Review's
annual budget, then we can see the relationship between the official budget
items and the externalized first-copy costs that the budget document omits.
26 Law journal editors' estimates of the hours spent on all tasks for a typical article
ranged from a low of twenty-seven student hours per article to a high of 400 hours per
article. I picked a plausible estimate in the middle. If the lowest number is more typical, we
could estimate editing costs at $2,781, and an annual first-copy cost at $308,781; if the
highest number is more nearly accurate, the estimated editing costs would be $41,200 and
the estimated annual first-copy cost would be $347,200.
27 U.S. Department of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the States (April 3, 2006),
http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm. Eighteen states have a higher minimum wage
than the U.S., and six have one that is lower. The highest minimum wage as of April 3, 2006,
was the state of Washington's at $7.63. A Washington minimum wage would increase the
student editing and production cost to $381.50 per article, or $7,630 per volume.
[Vol. 10:4
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Expenses Revenues
Subscriptions $ 16,000





Law school support 16,000
Total $351,150 $ 40,000
Constructive Annual Budget
The most obvious feature of this constructive first-copy cost is that it
completely dwarfs the Model Law Review's official budget of $40,000. A
second notable feature is the number of different entities that make substantial
contributions to the subsidy of the journal. Subscribers and readers pay
$16,000. The Model School of Law and its students contribute a total of
$27,150 plus overhead. Twelve different universities throw in $25,000 each.
Finally, none of these contributors appears to be motivated in any way by the
incentives provided by the copyright system.
A. First-Copy Cost Subsidy Dwarfs the Official Budget
The single most expensive item in the constructive first-copy cost I've
presented is that of the authors' salaries I've attributed to the articles published
in the journal. When discussing scholarly publishing, it is conventional to
exclude authors' indirect compensation (as distinguished from publisher-paid
royalties) from the first-copy cost, since the scholarly journal doesn't pay it.
28
By including it as an element of the first-copy cost, am I putting my thumb on
the scales? If we're considering only a journal's operating costs, it makes sense
to ignore costs the journal doesn't pay. If, however, we're trying to assess the
virtues and vices of different models of scholarly communication, we need to
include real costs paid by entities other than the journal to evaluate which
models make sense. The legal academy subsidizes the cost of generating and
publishing legal scholarship to a degree that makes the expense of printing and
mailing law journals insignificant. In order to make sensible policy decisions
about the business models appropriate for scholarly legal publishing, we need
to consider the economics of the entire enterprise and not merely the items
reflected on a typical law journal's annual budget.
28 See, e.g., Theodore C. Bergstrom, Free Labor for Costly Journals?, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2001, at 183, 187; Bot et al., supra note 23.
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B. The Source of the Subsidy Is Spread Out Across the Legal Academy
What is it that the Model School of Law and the other twelve universities
whose expenditures fund the Model Law Review in any given year think they
are buying with their money? They're investing in the creation and publication
of law review articles. They do this because they view the production of legal
scholarship as within their core mission, as important to the legal academy as
their function of educating lawyers. Once that scholarship is generated,
moreover, its investors get the most bang for their buck if it is disseminated,
read, and cited as widely as possible. Although legal scholarship, like other
scholarship, can find itself incorporated into practical and sometimes even
profit-generating activities, 29 those activities will pay no royalties or fees for
the use of published legal research. There's no financial or reputation benefit to
the universities involved from restricting access to any of the work.
C. The Copyright System Plays No Role
Indeed, it is not at all clear who owns the copyrights in the articles, notes,
and comments that the Model Law Review publishes. Like many law journals,
the Model Law Review has a form publishing agreement in which it asks
authors to assign copyrights in accepted manuscripts to the review. If authors
object to the request, the journal instead requests a nonexclusive license to
print, reprint, publish, distribute, and authorize the electronic reproduction of
the piece in Lexis, Westlaw, and other services.30 Although the Review has
contracts with Lexis, Westlaw, and Copyright Clearance Center authorizing
them to engage in reproduction of the material it publishes, the contracts don't
speak to copyright ownership. They require only that the Review have
copyright owners' permission to grant photocopy or electronic licenses in the
material that it publishes.3 1 In no case does the Model Law Review investigate
whether the copyright in a submission is owned by the person who wrote it or
is instead claimed by the university who employs her under the work made for
29 Sometimes, for example, a theory or argument initially propounded in a law review
article or Note will find its way into a litigator's brief. See, e.g., Lucinda Finley, Note,
Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the
1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560 (1980); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (relying on Finley note); Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (relying on the Warren & Brandeis article).
30 For a different approach, see University of Chicago Law School, The Supreme Court
Review, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/supremecourt/supremecourt.html. The Supreme Court
Review has devised its own intuitively appealing but legally incoherent copyright policy:
Copyright: The Review is published by The University of Chicago Press, which owns
the legal copyright for the entire contents of each volume; authors are understood to
retain an equitable copyright in their work, and indeed articles frequently form the basis
of more extended publications at a later date.
31 See West Group License Agreement (on file with author); Mead Data Central
License Agreement (on file with author).
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hire doctrine. 32 The uncertainty over whether scholarly articles are subject to
the copyright work made for hire doctrine under the 1976 Copyright Act is
longstanding. 33 It remains unresolved chiefly because so little turns on the
answer.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN ACCESS LAW PUBLISHING
The research ecosystem outlined above seems like one for which open
access publishing would be ideal. So long as contributors were assured of
receiving attribution for their work, they would all benefit from open access
publication. None of the contributors to an issue of the Model Law Review
would be harmed or inconvenienced if the contents of the issue were freely
available to as many people and in as many forms as possible. That raises one
question that inspired this conference: if open access publishing is ideal for
legal scholarship, why don't we see more of it?
The primary reason, I think, for the legal academy's sloth in adopting open
access publishing is the absence of any demand-side pressure to explore lower
cost alternatives to the traditional subscription model. In contrast to the world
of nonlegal scholarly 4publishing, the cost to fill library shelves with legal
scholarship is modest. Law journal subscription prices are low, and have risen
at less than the rate of inflation for a generation. Meanwhile, law academics
have long had "feels free" access to electronic versions of published law review
articles through Lexis and Westlaw, which make their databases available to
law schools at a bulk discount rate. The impetus for open access legal
publishing has been entirely a matter of supply-side pressure. Legal scholars
who wish their work to be read by scholars outside the legal academy cannot
count on reaching them through Westlaw and Lexis. Scholars and the law
schools that employ them have taken the lead in self-archiving in order to
achieve the benefits of enhanced access to their work. They have deposited
their manuscripts in open access depositories like the SSRN Legal Scholarship35 36
Network eLibrary,35 and BE Press Legal Repository. Law schools haveagreed to pay significant amounts of money to SSRN and BE Press to publicize
32 See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988);
Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (D. Colo. 1998);
Town ofClarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Kenneth D.
Crews & David Wong, Ownership and Rights of Use of Works Created at the University: A
Survey of American University Copyright Policies (Jan. 30, 2004),
http://www.surf.nl/copyright/files/Policy-analysis-ownership-zwollelIl.pdf (summarizing
different university copyright policies).
33 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of
1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 590, 591-92 (1987); Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They
"Works Made for Hire " Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 485 (1982).
34 See, e.g., Paul George, et al., The Future Gate to Scholarly Legal Information,
AALL SPECTRUM, Apr. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.aallnet.org/products/
pub sp0504/pub_sp0504_MB.pdf.
35 See Social Science Research Network, supra note 18.
36 Berkeley Electronic Press, Bepress Legal Repository, http://law.bepress.com/
repository/.
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the availability of their faculties" drafts. SSRN has promoted its eLibrary by
ranking law schools and individual faculty authors by the number of times their
papers have been downloaded.37
Law journals have been less eager to jump on the open access bandwagon
because of real and perceived threats open access poses to their way of doing
business. In the perceived threat column, I'd put concern over the impact on
Westlaw, Lexis, and Copyright Clearance Center royalties. There's no reason
to expect that adopting an open access publication model would diminish those• 38
funds significantly. Westlaw and Lexis in particular have perfected the art of
collecting large sums of money for access to material that is already in the
public domain, by making it available subject to useful search functionality.
Most researchers encountering Professor Lauren Example's latest article, Roots
and Rights, on Westlaw are not the people who already know that it was
published in volume sixty-four of the Model Law Review at page 513, but
instead folks who encountered it while searching for law review articles that
discussed the civil rights afforded to rutabagas and turnips. The fact that the
article also appears somewhere else in an open access online archive is unlikely
to have any impact on the number of viewers who find the piece in Lexis or
Westlaw. A real threat, though, is the potential disaggregation of law journal
issues that follows from open access publishing relying principally on author
self-archiving. If I do read Professor Example's article by downloading it from
the BE Repository, I may never know that Model Law Review published it as
part of its symposium on vegetable law, and may never look at the Model law
student note on the jurisprudence of summer and winter squash.
In response, a small number of law journals have recently begun making
archives of their content available online.39 That experiment has inspired some
of them to try out other formats for online publishing, as a supplement and
37 See Social Science Research Network, SSRN Top Law Schools (Beta),
http://hq.ssm.com/rankings/Ranking-Display.cfm?TMY-gID=2&TRN-gID=I; SSRN Top
1500 Law Authors (Beta), http://hq.ssm.com/tournaments/
tournament-display.cfm?TRNglD=6&TMY gID=5&order-ASC.
38 Hunter, supra note 12, at 632.
39 See, e.g., Columbia Law Review, The Review Archive,
http://www.columbialawreview.org/archives/; Harvard Law Review, Recent Issues,
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/recentissues.shtml; Michigan Law Review, Current Issue,
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/index-mlr.htm; NYU School of Law, Law Review, Issues
Archive, http://www.law.nyu.edu/joumals/lawreview/issues/index.html; University of
Chicago Law Review, Archived Issues, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/
index.html; Yale Law Journal, Archive, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/archive.asp. The
terms of online access differ. All five law journals make their contents available on the web
at no charge. Harvard, Columbia, and the University of Chicago reserve all rights under
copyright. See Columbia Law Review, Permission Requests,
http://www.columbialawreview.org/information/permissions.cfm; Harvard Law Review,
Copyright Permission, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/copyright.shtml; University of
Chicago Law Review, Permissions, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/permissions. Yale and
NYU grant permission for free educational copying. NYU School of Law, Law Review
Copyright Policy, http://www.law.nyu.edu/joumals/lawreview/copyright.html; Yale Law
Journal, About the Journal, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/about.asp.
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enhancement to the traditional fare they've published for many years.40 That
development has the potential to transform legal scholarship.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR NONLEGAL OPEN ACCESS PUBLISHING
Can we generalize from these insights to some conclusions that apply
beyond legal scholarship? General scholarly publishing introduces some
nontrivial complications. First, in the absence of a pool of students to do the
work of editing and typesetting, scholarly journals need to employ professional
publishing assistance. This requires them either to set the subscription price for
their journals at a high enough rate to recoup editing expenses as well as
printing expenses, or increase the direct subsidy to the journals. Many nonlegal
journals, moreover, are not university-affiliated, so a source for non-
subscription subsidy may be difficult to identify. Nonlegal scholarly publishing
typically employs a peer review system for editorial selection. Peer reviewers
are usually volunteers, whose compensation comes from the universities that
employ them, but some additional cost to the journal comes from administering
the peer review process. Some learned societies, rather than subsidizing their
research journals, rely on subscription revenues to subsidize activities other
than scholarship. For these reasons, and because of the presence of commercial
journal publishers, subscription prices to many scholarly periodicals have risen
astronomically.
For all of these differences, though, essential things are similar. The
largest category of expense will again be the salaries and stipends of the
individuals who are performing the scholarly research, 4 1 although the disparity
between the cost of generating scholarship and the cost of disseminating it may
be less stark. If commercial publishers of scholarly journals were required to
reimburse the salary costs of the authors of articles published by the journals,
the publishers would be unable to persuade subscribers to pay the high prices
necessary to cover their costs. Thus, as in law, we have a system for
disseminating scholarship that relies heavily on subsidies from the employers
of individuals engaged in publishable research. Indeed, universities and other
centers of research are paying two distinct types of subsidies--once in salaries,
benefits and other costs for their researchers, and again for the high
"institutional" subscription price for scholarly journals. In nonlegal research,
the only entities motivated by copyright are the publishers themselves, who
may have come to rely on controlling access to research results in order to fund
their publishing ventures. Moreover, because publishers have found it
40 See, e.g., Duke Law & Technology Review, iBlawg, http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/dltr/iblawg/; Michigan Law Review, First Impressions,
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/first impressions.htm; Harvard Law Review Forum,
About the Forum, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/aboutforum.shtml; Yale Law
Journal, The Pocket Part, http://www.thepocketpart.org/.
41 Differences among disciplines will change the numbers: in many non-law
disciplines, coauthorship is common, articles are shorter, and scholars are expected to
produce a larger number of them. The first two differences will tend to increase article costs
relative to legal scholarship, and the third will tend to decrease them.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 793 2006
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
expedient to raise prices repeatedly, the potential of open access publishing to
serve as a replacement for conventional publishing seems far more compelling
than it does in law, where subscriptions remain cheap.
My analysis of the externalized costs of scholarly publishing suggests that
universities and other research centers might explore the option of demanding
value-beyond the satisfaction of having spent one's funds advancing one's
core mission-in return for their contribution to the publication of research.
More generally, it may be useful to stop thinking of academic spending on
research as a library budget plus a math department budget plus a sociology
budget. Perhaps, rather than assigning copyrights to outsiders to bribe them to
publish research, the academy might give some consideration to bringing more
of these scholarly functions in-house, or to exploring more explicit models of
collaboration among academic institutions. Universities and other research
centers are already paying the individuals to perform the research, peer-review
the submissions, and edit the journals in which they appear. They are paying
again to allow their researchers to read the work that they've done. If they
looked at the entire research ecosystem that they're funding, it is possible they
would decide that all of the pennies they are spending are being spent well.
Alternatively, they might conclude that establishing a small printing operation
in the library department to generate hard copies of downloaded periodicals,
encouraging their faculty to prefer editing and peer review requests from
journals that permit self-archiving, and shifting their subscriptions budget to
favor open access journals, would buy more research for comparable
expenditures.
VII. CONCLUSION
Instead of asking whether open access journals can act like conventional
scholarly journals without relying on the subscription revenues made possible
by access restrictions, it's more useful to think about whether they can
engender a less dysfunctional environment for scholarly publishing than the
one we currently enjoy. This is true for legal scholarship and seems equally true
for nonlegal scholarship. In both cases, universities and other research centers
expend massive amounts of money to generate and support research,
scholarship and scholarly publications. Those expenditures vastly outweigh the
modest operating budgets of even the most expensive scholarly journals. Thus,
any analysis predicated on the economics of scholarly publishing should focus
on the economics of the scholarly enterprise rather than the budgets of the
journals that propagate its results. Where open access publishing can enhance
the dissemination and impact of scholarly research, it seems like a good bargain
for all concerned, for reasons that are primarily not financial. Because
publication costs are so small a slice of overall research expenditures, open
access publishing seems unlikely to have significant impact on the cost of
generating and disseminating research beyond requiring research centers to
shift some of their expenditures from column A to column B. Nor do we have
enough experience with open access publishing to conclude with any
confidence that it will reduce the overall costs of consuming scholarly research.
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It may. It may instead simply spread the costs more thinly, by disaggregating
scholarly compilations and imposing the print costs on multiple individual
computer printouts rather than bound volumes. But making research more
accessible, even if it generates no significant cost savings, seems likely to
improve the quality of scholarly research across the board, and seems worth
doing on those grounds alone.
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